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Domestic and international supply 
and demand shocks are an 
important driver of NRP fluctuations 
through their impacts on relative 
border or domestic prices.  
T
today consisting of the founding members together 
with Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan. Since 2010 
cooperation has consisted of a common market 
and a customs union, with duty-free intra-regional 
trade and a Common External Tariff (CET) on imports 
from outside the EAC. Future goals are the establish-
ment of a monetary union with a single currency, 
and eventually a political federation with common 
foreign and security policies (EAC 2017). Despite the 
existence of a common market, EAC intra-regional 
commodity trade (in USD terms) as a share of 
external trade with non-EAC countries has remained 
stable at around 13 percent during 2010-2014; 
similarly EAC exports as a share of imports fluctuated 
around 35 percent, but with no visible tendency for 
the trade deficit of around USD 15 billion to improve 
(UN Comtrade 2016).
Rice is a major staple commodity in the EAC. With 
the exception of South Sudan, which produces insig-
nificant quantities of rice and is excluded from our 
analysis, all EAC member countries consume, 
produce and trade large quantities of the 
commodity. The strategic importance of rice is 
further underscored by the fact that all rice-produc-
ing countries in the EAC have adopted rice develop-
ment strategies with aims such as raising production 
or productivity, attaining self-sufficiency (i.e., substi-
tuting imports), and expanding exports. Successful 
implementation of these rice development 
strategies requires not only an understanding of the 
constraints faced within domestic rice value chains, 
but also how countries’ rice value chains can jointly 
benefit from deepening regional integration.  
Production rises, but yields have
stagnated and imports remain high…
Milled rice production in the EAC increased from just 
under one million tonnes in 2005 to 1.8 million tonnes 
in 2014 (FAOSTAT 2016). During this period Tanzania 
accounted for around 83 percent of production, 
Uganda 9 percent, and Kenya, Burundi and 
Rwanda less than 5 percent each. All EAC countries 
recorded positive output growth, with the exception 
of Burundi. Rice yields, however, have stagnated, 
implying that production increases were mainly 
driven by land expansion. Yields remain highest in 
Rwanda, averaging five tonnes per hectare during 
2005-2014, while they vary between two and four 
tonnes per hectare in other EAC countries.
 
Despite rapid output growth, regional rice 
production still lags demand. During 2005-2014 
around one quarter of rice consumed was sourced 
from international markets, half of which came from 
Pakistan. However, there are large disparities in 
import dependency over the period: Tanzania’s rice 
import share never exceeded 5 percent, while it 
doubled in Uganda and Rwanda to reach 34 and 54 
percent, respectively. Intra-regional rice trade is 
limited, with only one-tenth of EAC countries’ rice 
imports originating from fellow EAC member 
countries (UN Comtrade 2016). 
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Exports from Tanzania to Uganda, Rwanda and 
Burundi represent the largest intra-regional rice 
trade flows, but these declined rapidly from 2010 
onwards due to adverse weather conditions in 
Tanzania and internal trade disputes. The latter 
related to accusations that Tanzanian exporters 
blended domestic rice with Asian rice, and led to 
the imposition of a 75 percent import tariff on 
Tanzanian rice in 2013 by Uganda, Rwanda and 
Burundi (Kilimo Trust 2014). While intra-regional rice 
trade has been stifled by policies, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) has emerged as an 
attractive destination for rice exports, particularly for 
Uganda and Rwanda, which channelled around 
one-third of their rice exports to the DRC in 2014 (UN 
Comtrade 2016).
  
…in spite of protective tariff measures
In the context of large rice import volumes from 
non-EAC countries and stagnant rice yields domesti-
cally, it is useful to consider how the policy and 
market environment has shaped incentives for rice 
value chain actors in the region to increase output, 
substitute imports, and exploit regional marketing 
opportunities. Applying a method developed by the 
Monitoring and Analysing Food and Agricultural 
Policies (MAFAP) programme of the Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO), we compute yearly 
average Nominal Rates of Protection (NRPs) for EAC 
rice farmers during 2005-2015. NRPs are obtained by 
estimating reference farm gate prices for rice in 
each country, derived from relevant border prices of 
imported rice after accounting for trade, transport 
and other access costs incurred during transporta-
tion and transformation of the product along the 
value chain. Formally, the NRP is computed as
where          is the observed farm gate price,         is 
the estimated reference price, and       is the price 
gap. A positive (negative) NRP indicates that 
farmers receive a price above the comparable 
reference price, and this is interpreted as an 
incentive (disincentive) to produce, brought about 
by policies or market distortions. Barreiro-Hurle and 
Witwer (2013) provide a detailed technical descrip-
tion of the methodology.
 
Results are displayed in Figure 1. In Tanzania and 
Uganda, for example, average NRPs exceeded 100 
percent during 2005-2015, meaning farm gate prices 
were more than double what they would have likely 
been under perfect market conditions. We find that 
domestic and international supply and demand 
shocks are an important driver of NRP fluctuations 
through their impacts on relative border or domestic 
prices. For instance, the drop in rice NRPs in Tanzania 
during 2008-2011 coincides with a maize export ban 
during that time. Once the ban was lifted, rice 
production declined which led to a rise in NRPs 
during 2012-2013. More detailed country-specific 
analyses can be found in the MAFAP (2017).
 
The persistently positive sign in NRPs in virtually all 
EAC countries over the analysis period is striking. This 
reflects a combination of the internalization of 
import tariffs in observed farm gate prices (tariffs are 
excluded from the reference price) and other policy 
distortions, such as minimum prices. However, 
equally interesting are the large disparities in NRPs 
across countries, despite the existence of a common 
market. Rice imported from outside the EAC was 
initially subject to a CET of 75 percent. However, 
member countries were subsequently given some 
autonomy in adopting unilateral tariff structures, 
which led to a wide range of tariffs being applied. 
For example, Uganda maintained its import tariff at 
75 percent, while Tanzania reduced its tariff to 35 
percent in 2013. Kenya also adopted a 35 percent 
tariff in 2009, while Burundi and Rwanda applied 
average tariff rates of 23 and 42 percent, respective-
ly, during 2009-2015 (EAC 2016).
 
Despite variations in tariffs across countries and over 
time, the trend in the share of the tariff cost within the 
price gap suggests that import tariffs have increas-
ingly explained high NRPs in EAC countries. In 
Rwanda, for instance, the tariff share at farm gate 
level was 36 percent until 2010 and increased to 72 
percent thereafter. In Uganda and Tanzania, this 
share frequently exceeded 100 percent, suggesting 
either weak price transmission or incomplete appli-
cation of the 75 percent import tariff rate. The 
conclusion is that incentives recently enjoyed by rice 
producers resulted mainly from import tariffs.
 
Given high price incentives for rice production over 
the last decade, one may legitimately ask why yields 
have stagnated or why import dependency remains 
so high. Shedding light on this puzzle requires a more 
in-depth look at the supply and demand dynamics 
within EAC rice markets.
Burdened supply faces shifting demand
With the exception of Tanzania, consumption 
exceeds domestic rice production in all EAC 
countries, despite the existence of significant price 
incentives for rice producers. Of course, price 
incentives do not imply profitability, and supply 
expansion is often constrained by structural factors. 
Therefore, rice yield gaps, which range from 20–45 
percent (Njeru et al. 2016; FAO 2015), cannot be 
closed by price incentives alone.
 
Water availability and sound water management 
are major constraints to rice production expansion in 
East Africa. In Uganda, for example, Kijima et al. 
from 3.6 to 5.2 percent during 2005-2010 (NISR 2012).
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(2012) note that the impact of improved seeds or 
increased fertiliser application on rice yields is greatly 
enhanced under irrigation; yet, only around five 
percent of rice fields are irrigated in Uganda, and 
similarly in Tanzania. Another constraint is land avail-
ability. Most EAC rice growers cultivate small plots of 
two hectares or less. In Rwanda, for instance, there is 
a positive correlation between plot size and the 
proportion of higher-value long grain rice varieties 
produced, and hence farmers’ earnings 
(Nabahungu and Visser 2013). Land consolidation is 
therefore likely to have a positive production 
impact, but will inevitably be associated with chal-
lenging land tenure problems (Place 2009).
 
On the demand side, regional consumption 
amounted to around 1.8 million tonnes of milled rice 
in 2013, of which 1.1 million tonnes were consumed 
in Tanzania (i.e., about 20 kilogram per capita per 
annum). Consumption has grown rapidly in other 
EAC countries, doubling, for example, in Rwanda 
and Kenya to around 10 kilogram per capita per 
annum over 2005-2014 (FAOSTAT 2016). Consump-
tion trends are driven both by population growth 
and growing consumer preference for rice in view of 
its cooking and storage properties. Moreover, as 
purchasing power increases, demand for higher 
quality rice, especially aromatic and long grain 
varieties, also increases (JICA 2013; Kilimo Trust 2014). 
These shifts explain the increase in demand for 
imports, especially in urban areas, since the quality 
of imported rice is usually superior. In Rwanda, for 
instance, the share of local rice within total food 
purchases declined from 4.2 to 3.2 percent in urban 
areas, while the share of imported rice increased 
from 3.6 to 5.2 percent during 2005-2010 (NISR 2012).
 
Tanzania is an exception to the rest of the EAC: firstly, 
Tanzanian aromatic varieties already compete 
effectively with Asian imports on quality terms; and 
secondly, the share of imports within national supply 
has traditionally been small given high levels of local 
supply and protective policies (FAO 2015). The 
question is whether rice value chains in Burundi, 
Uganda, Rwanda or Kenya could be transformed so 
that domestic producers can effectively compete 
with imports, at least in the medium-term, and within 
the current protected market environment, or in the 
long term in a more liberalized one. The literature 
provides mixed responses. Kikuchi et al. (2016) argue 
local rice in Uganda is competitive only under 
irrigation. They further argue that the quality differen-
tial with imports needs to be addressed at the 
processing stage, echoing findings from Stryker 
(2010) for Rwanda. Evaluating cost-benefit ratios of 
investments in rice milling equipment across the EAC 
is an important area for further research.  
Conclusion: dividends of regional 
integration for East African agriculture 
appear difficult to pinpoint in the 
foreseeable future
Within an environment of deepening regional 
integration, the performance and development of 
domestic agricultural value chains would tend to be 
affected by both domestic and regional policies, 
thus posing significant coordination challenges to 
value chain actors and policymakers. In this context, 
the example of rice value chains in the EAC 
countries is interesting, especially considering the 
strategic importance attached to this value chain in 
the majority of member countries. 
Regional integration in the EAC is currently premised 
on the principle of a common market with duty-free 
intra-regional trade and a CET applied on imports 
from non-EAC countries. Yet, already early on in the 
integration process, EAC member countries were 
given a significant degree of autonomy in defining 
country-specific protective measures for rice, 
resulting in members adopting an inward-looking 
approach to rice sector development. This included 
the imposition of unilateral restrictions on both 
external rice imports and intra-regional rice trade, 
seemingly with a clear intention of insulating 
domestic rice markets from the effects of a deeper 
integration. However, significant levels of protection 
did not translate into yield increases or declining 
import-dependency in Rwanda, Uganda or Kenya in 
particular. This reflects both structural constraints to 
production expansion (e.g. ability to exploit irrigation 
potential or land tenure issues) and a failure of 
domestic rice value chains to compete with high-
er-quality imported rice varieties that are increasing-
ly preferred by consumers. 
More broadly, there appears to be a lack of a 
common vision around joint agricultural sector 
development across EAC countries. This undermines 
the foundations of the Community and, as a result, 
regional integration in agriculture has not been able 
to address most of the structural barriers to the 
emergence of a vibrant and well-integrated agricul-
tural sector. In the case of rice, targeted and 
concerted regional policies on irrigation (to increase 
yields), market information (to improve price trans-
mission), market infrastructures (to reduce costs and 
supply deficit areas more easily) or diversification 
and transformation (to improve quality and respond 
to demand shifts) could have, arguably, been 
strongly beneficial to EAC rice value chains. While in 
the short run, rice producers in each EAC country 
may gain from unilateral protection—which also has 
clear political pay-offs for national govern-
ments—the lack of integration may ultimately 
translate into persistent import dependency in the 
long run, as a large portion of producers fail to 
improve their competitiveness.
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39
Transformations, Revue Interventions économiques, Mars 2017
from 3.6 to 5.2 percent during 2005-2010 (NISR 2012).
  We conclude that the premises of regional integra-
tion, which include the need for some agriculture 
areas or countries to specialize, are not yet readily 
accepted by EAC members. For example, given its 
dominant position as a producer of high-quality rice, 
Tanzania could conceivably adopt the role of 
supplying high-quality rice to urban markets in the 
region; Rwanda, in turn, already a high-yielding rice 
producer, could specialize in production and 
regional supply of cheaper short grain varieties often 
preferred by poorer, rural consumers.
Ultimately, risk aversion stands out as the main 
constraint to regional integration in the EAC. 
Members are reluctant to increasingly rely on 
regional trade, accept and implement common 
decisions, and eventually deliberately transfer sover-
eignty to the regional level, at which point the Com-
munity’s interests prevail over those of individual 
members. These obstacles are not uncommon in 
regional integration processes, and are in many 
respects similar to what has been observed 
elsewhere, such as in the European Union. It remains 
that if the premises of regional integration are not 
met, it is unlikely that it can bear fruits. 
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Annex
Figure 1. Nominal Rates for Protection (NRPs) for rice 
faced by representative producers in Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, 2005-2015.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on MAFAP price incentive 
indicators databases (MAFAP 2017). 
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